

THAT THE PEOPLE MAY BE FED: DROUGHT
AND FAMINE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 1991-1993

By Reginald Herbold Green

The Summer is past.
The harvest is gathered.
And we are not saved.

- Jeremiah

I.

The Apocalypse Drought

Over 1991-92 the main rains faltered or failed along the Indian Ocean coast of Africa from the Cape to Cairo with the exception of northern Mozambique and Tanzania. On the Atlantic side, the drought stretched through Namibia into southern Angola. For the Southern African Development Conference region and for eight of its ten member States it was the worst drought leading to the worse crop out-turn in living memory.

The folk-saying of the people of Gaza Province in Mozambique "When the great river runs dry, the end of the world is at hand" became searing reality as, for most of its course from Beitbridge to the Indian Ocean the great Limpopo River was reduced to remnant puddles or trickles and dried, cracked mud flats. Other major rivers dwindled to 10% to 30% of normal flows and by October two major cities - Beira and Bulawayo - were on the verge of complete drying up of water supply and limited flows through hydro power stations created severe electricity shortages from Tanzania through Zimbabwe. Hundreds of thousands of rural people had been forced from their homes, desperate forced migrants in search of water.

For Southern Africa estimated grain out-turn as of April was 56% of 'normal' (Table 1). Excluding Angola and Tanzania it was 35%. Even allowing for slightly less draconic loss of some other crops (e.g. cassava, plantains but not oil seeds) and somewhat better actual out-turns in northern Mozambique and Tanzania, the spectre of famine leaps from the

figures. This is especially the case because 'normal' refers to 1987/91, so for Mozambique and Angola is a war scorched, sub-survival level base.

The impact of the drought has been worsened by the context in which it occurred. Economic unsuccess and war debilitated the major Southern African states throughout the 1980s. The very real 1986-91 recovery with gross domestic product and food production growth exceeding that of population regionally and for most countries, was also and is fragile. In war ravaged Angola and Mozambique, the pre-drought food deficit (after imports) stood around 25% of national needs. With drought losses the Mozambique deficit would, in the absence of additional food aid, have risen to 45% in rural areas and 43% overall. The underlying causal factor is that of the order of 50% of the total Angolan and Mozambican populations are refugees, domestic forced migrants or pauperised in place among the ruins of their farms and homes in combat zones. The parallel is that infrastructure destruction makes rapid movement of relief food hard to impossible - especially if there are breakdowns or violations of the peace process.

Perhaps because the drought was so major, national, regional and FAO/WFP early warning systems performed adequately to well. By November 1991 they indicated danger of disaster (very late and inadequate rains), by January impending disaster (barring miraculous late rains), by March full scale disaster on an unprecedented scale. That is as early as the weather/crop cycle allows warnings to come.

But the passing on of the warnings until February was not equally prompt or clear. The FAO/WFP reports contained them but in such a low key as not to strike home to readers what was happening. The SADC (then SADCC) Food Security Unit's incomplete regional warning of actual disaster came in February parallel to national alarms from Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique and Zambia. By March an independent estimate of over 5,000,000 tonnes additional (about 6,000,000 to 6,250,000 total allowing for 1991/92 extra regional imports) food imports and at least 3,500,000 tonnes additional food aid requirements (4,500,000 gross when added to the 1991/92 base) had been made. The later FAO/WFP Mission Report conclusion was that total imports needed to be 6,743,000 tonnes and food aid 4,363,000 tonnes (Table 2).

Technically the early warning system worked well. Practically no stand by alarm went out in December and no alarm in January. As a result the FAO/WFP Mission was brought forward from June to April rather than from June to February/March as would have been fully justified on January data.

II.

The response from March through June was unusually prompt and energetic. The April FAO/WFP Mission, drawing on other UN Agency field staff (especially UNICEF in respect to water) documented the magnitude of the 1992 crop failure and 1992/93 famine potential with 18,000,000 people deprived of the means to produce or to buy food. The speed and detail with which it was able to do this was in large part the result of the national and regional early warning and calamity (natural disaster) and catastrophe (man made disaster - i.e. war) response mechanisms as well as of support from international NGOs and bilateral donors.

The parameters of need set out for the June 1992 Geneva Southern African Appeal conference co-sponsored by the United Nations and SADCC (now SADC) included (Table 3):

1. 4,843,000 tonnes of food aid (2,313,000 tonnes Emergency) or 3,566,000 above levels previously pledged for 1992/93 before the extent of the drought became known;
2. approximately \$437 million of net additional support for transport and distribution; water, and the non-food costs of camps and works programmes less pre-conference pledges and potential additional monetisation of additional food aid for urban sale.

Pledges appear to have totalled about 60% of both physical and financial targets but with water and rehabilitation (tools/agriculture) under 20% of targets. Exact levels are hard to work out because some previously committed food aid and some quasi commercial soft loan food for resale were not committed while in certain cases additional general balance of payments support cash grants were made in the disaster context.

In retrospect - apart from the dangerously low pledge level - six weaknesses stand out:

1. underestimation of and inadequate information on national and regional as well as on domestic NGO capacity by the United Nations family leading to a lower than possible degree of coordination and joint planning;
2. serious underestimation, both nationally and internationally (followed by even more serious underpledging) of the drinking water crisis confronting many people in the region;
3. failure to create an overall mechanism to track turning of pledges into commitments and especially into a dated delivery schedule with a view to achieving a rapid and predictable flow;
4. underestimation of Angola's emergency needs - flowing largely from war not drought - resulting in unrealistically low import and aid estimates;
5. the over 2,000,000 tonnes (about 700,000 for Zimbabwe) of food implicitly targeted for commercial importation out of drought stricken states' own foreign exchange earnings which was dangerously high in terms of their external balance constraints and domestic fiscal fragility;
6. inadequate attention to Tanzania's fiscal problem resulting from northern and southern domestic surpluses available to meet central and northwestern deficits but in a context of severe national budget constraints whose breaching would (presumably does) threaten IMF/World Bank support for its relatively successful Structural Adjustment Programme.

The March-June mobilisation was relatively rapid and well designed while the pledging response was above average for major recent emergency appeals. But the euphoria - especially internationally - after the conference was ill-founded. The pledges were not adequate and - given the normal 3 to 8 month lag from pledges to delivery combined with the very low harvest out-turn - were likely to arrive too late to avert famine especially in Mozambique. In two cases war and its aftermath was certain (even if actual

fighting ended by October/November as it did in Mozambique) to limit distribution capacity.

III.

Contrary to June hopes, the pledges/requirements gap did not close after the conference. As of October, total food pledges in physical terms were about 60% of target - 80% for emergency but under 50% for other (i.e. food for resale in urban areas and food for work) food aid. Water, tools and agriculture remained grossly underfunded (little over 10% on some estimates).

The country breakdown was even more alarming especially in the cases of Mozambique, Tanzania and Angola. Mozambique pledges totalled only 54% of target (740,000 of 1,360,000). While one reason was doubts as to distributional capacity, this was in part circular. Inadequate cash pledges to logistics and failure to move promptly to contract hire more private hauliers (as the government desired and as the rapid reduction of war risk facilitated) played a large part in the absorption capacity constraint as did the national decapacitation resulting from fragmented, multiple, ill-coordinated interventions and parallel distribution systems. Tanzania pledges appeared to be under 20% albeit this may have failed to include soft loan wheat for resale. No aid to defray domestic costs of onshore procurement to meet ration distribution in drought hit districts was recorded. Angola's pledges were 78% of target but, as noted, the target of 85,000 tonnes gravely understated requirements especially in the pre-election context of growing access to previously war or mine isolated rural areas.

The lag from pledges to deliveries was proving much longer than anticipated. As of early October only 10% of total April 1992/March 1993 pledges had arrived. Much of the 90% - including some pre-conference commitments - had no target arrival dates let alone firm shipment schedules. As a result, countries with the resources to do so had been forced to divert scarce foreign exchange to continuing commercial imports. The lag is especially serious because it means maximum attempts to move supplies up country will be needed during the November-March rainy season when many roads become nearly impassable.

On-the-ground performance, as expected, diverged markedly. Botswana, as anticipated, was coping effectively. Tanzania's, admittedly rough and ready, system was getting the food out admittedly with an inadequate work for food programme to use food aid and enforced 'spare' time to improve rural infrastructure and only at the cost of serious fiscal problems. Zimbabwe after a slow start had moved to distributing up to 30,000 tonnes of emergency aid a month to about 5,000,000 recipients - at least twice as much to twice as many recipients as any other programme.

Zambia - using both government and NGO channels - had performed well above what previous experience would have predicted and clearly was safe from large scale starvation. Swaziland - making creative use of domestic NGOs (notably its national Red Cross) was also coping well.

The countries in which the spectre of famine still stalked - indeed was already reaping its grim harvest of graves - were Angola and Mozambique. Up to the election Angolan rural distribution was improving. The return to belligerency after UNITA rejected the election results reversed this, especially in the drought stricken southern provinces. In Mozambique competitive, ill-coordinated distribution systems and the return home of many deslocados, afectados and refugees after the General Peace Accord of early October, combined with inadequate arrivals of food aid to create rising levels of extreme malnutrition and death with the prospects for early 1993 grim. This was compounded by the inability of distribution systems to switch rapidly to add districts of return to the existing districts of refuge network - a weakness paralleled by UNHCR in relation to refugees. Failure to accept interim arrangements for drawing rations at camps (where some family members usually remain during initial re-establishment) by families engaged in home livelihood rehabilitation has - to date - increased famine risks rather than deterring either domestic or international forced migrants from returning home.

The regional and most national logistical arrangements have worked well - up to a point. This is largely the result of cooperation within SADC and bilaterally with a key role played by Zimbabwe's Ministry of Transport. The Beira and Dar es Salaam corridors are moving substantial volumes while the still not fully rehabilitated Nacala and Maputo corridors are functioning as are land routes from Namibia to Zambia and, until the October crisis, Angola. South Africa has been cooperative in liaising on

routings, allocation of rolling stock (including leases as far afield as TAZARA) and making commercial sales out of domestic stocks which it will itself replace by imports given its own deficit of up to 5,000,000 tonnes. The key problem is the lag in pledge deliveries and lack of a firm delivery schedule for food aid which makes proper logistical planning at and from ports impossible and threatens to create bottle-necks if shipments suddenly bunch early in 1993.

Prospects, Reflections and Reforms

The great Southern African drought of 1991/92 will not lead to the great Southern African famine of 1992/93. Despite severe strains, national emergency systems have functioned. Despite lags and low commitments the international response has been significant and has exorcised the spectre of mass deaths. There are deaths - which began as early as April, more then from lack of water and forced migration to seek it than from lack of food. Drought and forced migration through the interaction of illness and malnutrition leading to otherwise avoidable death will kill thousands - especially in Mozambique and Angola. But - even in most of rural Mozambique and Angola - there are no scenes like those from Somalia. Battered and tenuous as they are, the emergency systems in both countries function (and are with rare exceptions guarded, not looted, by the armed forces). Civil governance, however weak, exists not only in large towns but in the countryside areas where perhaps two thirds of the rural population live. To that extent the Southern African 1991/92 experience is a qualified success with hundreds of thousands of lives clawed back from the brink of the grave.

Precisely because, up to a point, it is a success it is possible to reflect on particular weaknesses and to posit reforms. These go far beyond the by now conventional wisdom that it is not drought alone, but drought in the context of war, which kills.

1. Emergencies should be seen as recurrent with national, regional and international response structures designed on that basis not on the assumption that calamities (notably drought but also floods in Southern Africa) are one-off and non-recurrent.
2. Early warning system data should be used to send out standby alerts as soon as a calamity is probable and to move to assessment and response

definition as soon as projected losses become severe and substantially irreversible. This is particularly practicable and crucial in the case of drought to which early response to enable households to stay on their farms and be ready to rehabilitate their livelihoods when the rains return is half the battle - a half that is all too often lost (even more in the Horn and the Sahel than in Southern Africa).

3. Emergency systems need to be nationally owned to be effective - with regional back-up (as by SADC) in data analysis, mobilisation and logistics where practicable. International support (including retrospective finance for bridging imports and fiscal assistance for on-shore procurement for free or work for food distribution) should be within, coordinated by and responsive to that national framework. This need not preclude multiple channels (including domestic civil society bodies and other NGOs) but external support should be primarily for domestic bodies and decapacitating, fragmenting, direct external agency operations are best seen as a last resort to be minimised whenever and wherever possible (as it is not at present in, e.g. Somalia, Sudan and Liberia).
4. Setting up monitoring arrangements tracking the course from pledges to commitments to delivery dates to arrival aimed at speeding up and providing accurate arrival pattern information (comparable to that in commercial transactions) is needed to allow proper national and regional management of logistics and distribution.
5. Food, seed and - when needed - tools should be perceived not only as humanitarian survival support (which they are) but also as the "working capital" necessary to enable calamity hit households to rehabilitate their livelihoods.
6. Work for food (or, if domestic commercial food channels are inadequate, food for work) programmes centring on rural infrastructure rehabilitation including reduction of vulnerability to future droughts or floods need to be pre-planned and linked to an ongoing labour intensive construction and maintenance programme so they can be quickly and efficiently brought into operation when a calamity strikes (as illustrated by the Botswana programme).

7. More attention should be paid to emergency water supply enhancement/protection including that to vulnerable urban areas during catastrophe response and to longer term improvements after the drought has passed. (Bulawayo's and Beira's extreme vulnerability had been known for some years).
8. In the case of reconstruction after war catastrophes (at the top of the agenda today in Mozambique, Ethiopia and hopefully Angola, and tomorrow in Somalia, Liberia and Sudan) viewing emergency and refugee support as the first phase of rehabilitation of livelihoods and planning ahead for their transmutation into strategies to enable households to re-establish themselves with access to supporting basic services, infrastructure and commercial networks is needed if peace is to lead on to rapid gains for forced migrants (who comprise half the total populations of Mozambique and Angola).

A massive tragedy has - barely - been averted in Southern Africa. But lives have been lost which could have been saved and suffering as well as forced migration have been unacceptably and unnecessarily high. Euphoria or relaxation (if the 1992/93 rains prove normal or better) would be an inappropriate and imprudent response. Rather the opportunity should be taken for a thorough process of reflection on, and reform of, national, regional and international catastrophe and calamity emergency response and post emergency rehabilitation perceptions, processes and institutions.

TABLE 1
FAO/WFP MISSION ESTIMATES
(April Assessment)

	Grain Production (tonnes)			Import Requirements ^m (tonnes)		Food Aid Requirements (tonnes)			Commercial Imports (tonnes)	
	1987/1991 Aug. ¹	1992	% Normal	Grain	Other ^a	Grain ⁷	Other	Of Which Emergency ^m	Grain ^{1d}	Other ^a
<u>Southern Africa</u>										
Zimbabwe	2,335,000	608,000	26	1,410,000	(75,000)	660,000	38,200	509,000	750,000	(36,800)
Mozambique	550,000 ²	226,000	41	1,381,000	(150,000)	1,303,000	101,000	688,000	78,000	(49,000)
Malawi	1,485,000	683,000	46	876,000	(75,000)	740,000	38,000	438,000	136,000	(37,000)
Zambia	1,600,000	572,000	36	970,000	(30,000)	820,000	15,000	109,000 ⁸	150,000	(15,000)
Tanzania	3,825,000	3,250,000	85	500,000	(10,000)	280,000	1,500	16,000 ⁸	220,000	(8,500)
Lesotho	172,500	81,000	47	297,000	(20,000)	75,000	3,000	78,000	222,000	(17,000)
Swaziland	140,000	53,000	38	129,000	(15,000)	60,000	5,500	47,000	69,000	(9,500)
Botswana	59,000	15,000	24	240,000	(50,000)	15,000	1,700	17,000 ⁸	225,000	(48,300)
Namibia	110,000	33,000	30	125,000	(35,000)	60,000	1,350	61,000	65,000	(33,650)
Angola	317,000 ²	454,000	143	285,000 ⁴	(70,000)	125,000 ⁴	20,000	136,000	160,000	(50,000)
(Sub Total)	10,600,000 ³	5,975,000	56 ³	6,213,000	(530,000)	4,138,000	225,000	1,967,000	2,075,000	(305,000)
(Excluding Tanzania and Angola)	6,450,000	2,275,000	35							
South Africa	12,150,000	3,650,000	30	5,500,000	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	22,750,000 ³	9,625,000	42 ³	11,713,000	(530,000)	4,138,000	225,000	1,967,000	2,075,000	(305,000)

Source: Adapted from FAO/WFP March-April 1992, Mission To Southern Africa.

Notes:

1. In general 1986/87, 1987/88 and 1988/89 were good crop years with 1989/90 and 1990/91 poor. However, there has been substantial inter and intra country divergence within this trend. Country figures computed from Mission 1992 crop and % of normal data.
2. War has both depressed output and hampered estimation of volume grown. Total production estimates appear to be too low but changes may be less so.
3. Sum total of country data from, or computed from, Mission Report. Mission implicit regional total crop figures are higher and, therefore, % of normal presented in report is lower than the total of their country data.
4. Implausibly low. Angola's recent past crop levels like Mozambique have been war (and insurgent tactics) devastated. Institutional and transport barriers - as well as financial - have limited past emergency assistance distribution to very low levels and imposed severe hunger constraints on isolated inland cities and towns. With the relaxation of the war, transport and to a degree institutional constraints the needed (for minimally adequate nutrition) imports required are probably on the order of 450,000 to 500,000 tonnes of food aid 275,000 to 350,000 tonnes and of emergency programme distribution 125,000 to 175,000 tonnes.
5. Net national territorial requirement (including resident refugees) excluding imports to replace regional exports (South Africa) and transit traffic to landlocked states (Tanzania, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa).
6. Rough estimate. Only direct emergency food aid requirement directly available from Mission Report.
7. In principle includes all amounts already pledged. In practice appears to exclude wheat imports which are de facto aid financed in Tanzania, Zambia Zimbabwe totalling perhaps 250,000 tonnes and up to 25,000 tonnes similarly financed rice imports in Tanzania.
8. For free ration, food for work, work for food and/or special project distribution. Includes grain and other.
9. Implausibly low. At least in cases of Tanzania and Botswana appears to exclude nationally organised free food ration distribution to severely drought (or flood) affected districts. Given the number of displaced persons in Angola a more plausible estimate would be of the order of 150,000 tonnes.
10. By subtraction Food Aid Requirement from Import Requirement. Inadequate estimates of local cross border imports and exports except for Zambia to Zaire.

TABLE 2

'NORMAL' AND POST DROUGHT FOOD 'BALANCE' POSITION
(TONNES GRAIN EQUIVALENT)

	<u>1991/1992</u>		<u>1992/1993⁵</u>	
Basic Requirement ¹	4,500,000	(100%)	4,500,000	(100%)
Domestic Production	<u>2,750,000</u>	(62%)	<u>2,060,000</u>	(46%)
Urban (Zonas Verdes)	<u>150,000</u>	(3%)	<u>110,000</u>	(2%)
Household Consumed	<u>(50,000)</u>	(1%)	<u>(40,000)</u>	(1%)
Commercialised	<u>(100,000)</u>	(2%)	<u>(70,000)</u>	(1%)
Rural	<u>2,600,000</u>	(59%)	<u>1,950,000</u>	(44%)
Household Consumed	<u>(2,100,000)</u>	(48%)	<u>(1,700,000)</u>	(39%)
Commercialised -				
Formal and Informal	<u>(500,000)</u>	(11%)	<u>(250,000)</u>	(5%)
Imports	<u>625,000²</u>	(13%)	<u>(525,000)</u>	(12%)
Food Aid	<u>(500,000)</u>	(11%)	<u>(500,000)</u>	(11%)
Commercial/Parallel	<u>(125,000)</u>	(2%)	<u>(50,000)</u>	(1%)
Food Deficit	<u>1,125,000</u>	(25%)	<u>1,915,000</u>	(43%)
<u>Urban/Rural Breakdown</u>				
	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>
Basic Requirement ³	1,080,000	3,420,000	1,080,000	3,420,000
Domestic Production	<u>550,000</u>	<u>2,200,000</u>	<u>310,000</u>	<u>1,750,000</u>
Urban	<u>(150,000)</u>	(-)	<u>(110,000)</u>	(-)
Rural	<u>(400,000)</u>	<u>(2,200,000)</u>	<u>(200,000)</u>	<u>(1,750,000)</u>
Household Consumed	<u>(50,000)</u>	<u>(2,100,000)</u>	<u>(40,000)</u>	<u>(1,700,000)</u>
Commercialised	<u>(500,000)</u>	<u>(100,000)</u>	<u>(270,000)</u>	<u>(50,000)</u>
Imports ²	400,000	225,000	(400,000)	(125,000)
Food Deficit	(130,000) (12%)	995,000 (29%) ⁴	370,000 (36%) ⁶	1,545,000 (45%) [*]

1 Based on 12,500,000 population estimate.

2 Probably understates total imports for 1991/92. May be 125,000 tonnes additional boarder imports from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi consumed in adjoining rural districts or nearby towns. Transborder exports to Malawi and Tanzania - not estimated - may be up to 50,000 tonnes. These are from areas - e.g. Angonia, Northern Mueda Plateau with poor transport links with the rest of Mozambique.

3 Based on 3,000,000 urban and 9,500,000 rural.

4 Intuitively 29% - borderline famine level - appears slightly too high (61% of basic nutritional need average availability too low). 125,000 tonnes of underestimated border area imports consumed in rural areas or reducing the actual Mozambican sources sales to towns would lower it to the 26% level which seems plausible.

5 Before additional food aid pledges.

6 After additional food aid the actual urban deficit will be substantially lower. The rural will be lower but many will be nearly 40%.

TABLE 3
IMPORT AND FISCAL REQUIREMENTS '1992/1993': FOOD AND DROUGHT
(Tonnes / \$)¹

<u>Imports</u>		<u>FOOD²</u> (tonnes)					<u>OTHER REQUIREMENTS AND SOURCES³</u> ($\text{\$}$)				
		<u>Food Aid⁴</u>									
Grain	Other Staple	Emergency ⁵	Other	Pledged ⁶ Pre-Drought	Gap ⁷		Transport/ Distribution ⁷	Water/Camps/ Work Programmes ⁸	Pledged Pre-Drought	Additional Monetisation ⁹	Gap ¹⁰
Zimbabwe ¹¹	1,410,000	75,000	509,000	300,000	75,000	734,000	60,000,000	60,000,000	5,000,000	15,000,000	100,000,000
Mozambique	1,381,000	150,000	688,000	615,000	600,000	703,000	100,000,000	60,000,000	30,000,000	5,000,000	125,000,000
Malawi	876,000	75,000	438,000	337,000	350,000	425,000	60,000,000	20,000,000	20,000,000	10,000,000	50,000,000
Zambia ¹²	970,000	30,000	209,000	670,000	100,000	779,000	40,000,000	20,000,000	5,000,000	20,000,000	35,000,000
Tanzania ¹²	500,000	10,000	116,000	300,000	50,000	366,000	25,000,000	15,000,000	5,000,000	7,500,000	27,500,000
Lesotho	297,000	20,000	78,000	100,000	30,000	148,000	7,500,000	10,000,000	7,500,000	2,500,000	7,500,000
Swaziland	129,000	15,000	47,000	19,000	5,000	61,000	3,000,000	2,500,000	1,000,000	500,000	4,000,000
Botswana ¹³	240,000	50,000	17,000	-	2,000	15,000	2,000,000	2,000,000	negl.	negl.	4,000,000
Namibia	125,000	35,000	61,000	39,000	15,000	85,000	7,000,000	8,000,000	2,500,000	500,000	12,000,000
Angola ¹⁴	500,000	70,000	150,000	50,000	50,000	250,000	35,000,000	35,000,000	5,000,000	8,000,000	57,000,000
Total											
Southern Africa	6,428,000	530,000	2,313,000	2,530,000	1,277,000	3,566,000	339,500,000	232,500,000	81,000,000	54,000,000	437,000,000

Sources: FAO/WFP Mission Report, "Tocsin", National Data

Notes:

1. Totals include baseline (pre-drought) and drought requirements.
2. Adjusted from Mission data for Angola and by inclusion of Other Staple Food (beans, legumes, vegetable, oil, sugar) in Imports as well as Emergency Food Aid Totals.
3. Adjusted to include estimates of all national free and food for work/work for food programming, except in the case of Botswana where part will be covered by commercial imports.
4. Includes food financed from general balance of payments support and concessional loan arrangements (especially for wheat and, secondarily rice) apparently excluded in Report. Adjusted upward in cases in which commercial import residual in Report's Table 1 (Table 2 above) appears unattainably high.
5. Rough estimate - broadly similar to 1990/91 deliveries.
6. Stated in tonnes because donor accounting prices for food and transport tend to be on average 25% to 50% above commercial import parity.
7. Average of \$100 tonne for emergency and \$25 tonne for non-emergency (basically monetised) food aid. Substantially higher in Mozambique and Angola.
8. Rough estimates because water shortage alleviation costs are not fully articulated and importance of drought displaced person camps (i.e. inability to meet food and water needs in home area), food for work/work for food and water supply security enhancing needs vary sharply by country.
9. Calculated on non-emergency portion of gap (assuming pre-drought pledged aid counterpart elements have already been allocated). Rough estimate of \$50 per tonne on account of built in 180 day lag in most states because credit ceilings prevent wholesaler using overdraft increase to buy on a cash basis. Given collection experience (lags and leakages) this may be an overestimate.
10. Fiscal gap arising from enhanced drought impact mitigation programme.
11. Zimbabwe's national 2,200,000 import requirement estimate covers 18 months with, of the order of 150,000 tonnes prior to and some 450,000 outside the 1992/93 period. The remaining apparent 200,000 tonne divergence seems to relate to divergence on minimum acceptable stocks to cover the time to a delayed harvest (or the time to mobilise aid) in drought disaster years. Increased aid estimate because Zimbabwe's external account and fiscal position are far too fragile to carry projected level of commercial imports and domestic financing.
12. Emergency requirement adjusted upward (within unchanged total). Mission figures below minimum Zambian rural relief requirements and 'normal' Tanzanian drought year District ration distribution levels.
13. Emergency figure may be correct in terms of external assistance sought. However, in that case it would seem that 50% or more of food will be provided by government out of commercial imports and general budget revenues. In the Botswana case this is perfectly practicable.
14. Import, aid, emergency figures all adjusted upward. Conclusion of war and some reallocation of personnel plus transport make much larger rural food distribution possible. Inability to deliver not lack of need has explained very low Angola imports relative to Mozambique.

Source Note:

This article draws on FAO/WFP, SADC and SCF reports on crop prospects, the FAO/WFP April 1992 Mission Report on Southern Africa and discussions with numerous UNICEF, UNDP and national officials. Some aspects have been covered in more detail in the author's "Sound The Tocsin: The Third Horseman Mounts To Ride: Drought In Southern And South Africa 1991-1993", IDS (Sussex) 1992; "Southern Africa: That The People May Be Fed: Tocsin through pledges and paper to transportation and distribution" in Food Policy, forthcoming; Signs Of Hope: Towards Rehabilitation and Renewed Development for the Children of Southern Africa (with R. Morgan and C. Davids), UNICEF, 1992; "Toward More Life Sustaining Calamity And Catastrophe Alleviation And Rehabilitation Action By The UN Extended Family", IDS (Sussex) 1992 and The Four Horsemen Ride Together: Scorched Fields Of War In Southern Africa, Refugee Studies Programme, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, 1993.

Author Note

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